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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and the order of the Utah Supreme Court
transferring this case to the Court of Appeals.
This is an appeal from the Judgment and Decree, and Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered against Appellant in a
civil action brought under Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 to recover the
reasonable value of services rendered for the placement of
telecommunications cable under a public street.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the placement of telecommunications cable

beneath the surface of a public road constitutes an "improvement
upon land," such that Appellant would be liable as an "owner"
under the contractor's bond statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 et
seq.
2.

Whether Respondent is entitled to prejudgment interest

in an action brought under Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 for the
"reasonable value of the labor performed or materials furnished,"
where Respondent did not have a direct or express contract with
Appellant.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1(1) (1987)
For purposes of this chapter:
(a) "Contractor" means any person who is or may be
awarded a contract for the construction,
alteration, or repair of any building, structure,
or improvement upon land.
(b) "Owner" means any person contracting for

construction, alteration, or repair of any
building, structure, or improvement upon land.
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 (1987)
Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond is liable to all
persons who have performed labor or have supplied materials
under the contract for the reasonable value of the labor
performed or materials furnished. No action to recover on
such liability may be commenced after the expiration of one
year after the day on which the last of the labor was
performed or the material was supplied by such person.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

Respondent Blaine Dalton (hereinafter "Dalton*) brought this
action against Appellant The Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company (hereinafter "U S WEST Communications7') under
the contractor's bond statute, Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2,1 to
recover for services rendered on a subcontract it entered with
Weule, Inc. (hereinafter "Weule"),2 the principal contractor, to
place telecommunications cable beneath a public road in South Salt
Lake City, Utah. (R. 2-7)

Judgment for $12,856.59, plus

prejudgment interest and costs, was entered against U S WEST
Communications following a trial to the court.

(R. 140-41, copy

attached as Addendum A)
1

Dalton also asserted claims based on the mechanics' lien
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 et seq., a quasi contract theory,
and a claim for attorney's fees, all of which were dismissed on
summary judgment. (R. 128-29) Dalton has not appealed that ruling.
2

Weule was also named as a defendant, but was apparently
never served with process inasmuch as it had filed bankruptcy.
2

B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On or about April 15, 1988, U S WEST Communications

entered into a contract with Weule, whereby Weule was to install
underground communications cable beneath a street in South Salt
Lake City.3

(Findings of Fact % 5, R. 135-39, copy attached as

Addendum B; Ex. 6-D; Tr. 68}
2.

On or about April 21, 1988, Weule engaged Dalton, as a

subcontractor, to perform the entire installation of the telephone
communication cable.
6-7)

(Findings of Fact f 7, R. 136; Ex. 1-P; Tr.

Weule's contract with Dalton provided for payment of 90% of

the amount Weule was to receive from U S WEST Communications.
(Exhibits 1-P, 2-P; Tr. 30)

Dalton started the job on about May

1, 1988 and completed the entire installation work on or about May
23, 1988.
3.

(Findings of Fact % 10, R. 136, Tr. 32-33)
All of the work under the subcontract was performed

within a public road right of way.
Tr. 23)

(Findings of Fact f 4, R. 136;

U S WEST Communications did not own an interest in the

property, whether in fee or by easement, but was a mere licensee,
having obtained a permit from South Salt Lake City.4

(Tr. 72-73,

76-77; Ex. 8)
3

There were three change orders to the original contract,
memorialized in Exhibit 9-D.
4

The Findings of Fact incorrectly state that U S WEST
Communications had obtained "unwritten" consent from South Salt
Lake City. (Findings of Fact %% 4, 6, R. 136) Exhibit 8-D
plainly shows that the permit was not "unwritten."

3

4.

U S WEST Communications did not require or obtain a

contractor's payment bond (Findings of Fact 1 12, R. 137), but
paid Weule the full amount owed under the principal contract in
the amount of $14,142.25.

(Tr. 78)

Weule did not pay Dalton for

the work performed on the subcontract.
5.

(Tr. 17)

Weule owes Dalton $12,365.59 for the performance of the

subcontract.

(Findings of Fact «f 19, R. 137)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
1.

For U S WEST Communications to be liable as an "owner"

under Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2, the work performed by Dalton must
relate to a "building, structure, or improvement upon land."
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the installation of
underground cable in a public street is not an improvement upon
land, because the work was not done as an integral part of the
construction, alteration or repair of any particular building or
structure.

The work performed by Dalton fails to meet even the

threshold requirement of an improvement, since it does not benefit
or add value to the land, which is a public street.

Furthermore,

only real property can qualify as an improvement under section 142-1.

Because the underground cable has not been annexed or

adapted to the public road it is personalty, not realty; hence the
contractor's bond statute does not apply to the present case.
2.

Dalton is not entitled to prejudgment interest because

his claim was not liquidated as to U S WEST Communications.
4

Under

Utah law, prejudgment interest is only allowed where the claim is
liquidated.

A liquidated claim must be calculable with

mathematical accuracy.

Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 allows recovery

for the reasonable value of labor performed and materials
furnished, which cannot be calculated with precision when it is a
disputed question for the trier of fact; hence it is not
liquidated and therefore is not the proper subject for prejudgment
interest.
ARGUMENT
I.

U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS IS NOT AN "OWNER" WITHIN THE MEANING
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 14-2-1 BECAUSE THE INSTALLATION OF
TELEPHONE CABLE IS NOT AN "IMPROVEMENT UPON LAND."
The principal issue in this appeal is whether Utah's

contractor's bond statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 et seq. (1987)
applies in the circumstances of this case.

Section 14-2-2 of that

statute states in part: "Any owner who fails to obtain a payment
bond is liable to all persons who have performed labor or have
supplied materials under the contract . . . ."

(emphasis added,)

The question, therefore, is whether U S WEST Communications is an
"owner" as that word is used in the statute.
The statute does not require ownership of an interest in land
to qualify a person as an "owner;"5 rather, section 14-2-1(1)(b)
5

Whether U S WEST Communications had an interest in the
public road was apparently an important consideration to the trial
court's decision (Conclusions of Law f 1; R. 138). U S WEST
Communications merely had a license to enter the road and install
the cable. (See Exhibit 8D) A license does not create any title
or interest in property. See, e.g., Kuhlman v. Rivera, 701 P.2d
982 (Mont. 1985). However, because the 1987 version of section
5

defines "owner" as "any person contracting for construction,
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement
upon land."6

Dalton has not alleged that the installation of

underground cable constituted the construction, alteration, or
repair of a "building" or "structure."

Therefore, whether U S

WEST Communications is an "owner," and hence liable under section
14-2-2, depends upon whether the installation of underground cable
beneath a public road constitutes an "improvement upon land."
A.

The installation of telephone cable was not an
"improvement upon land.*

The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the contractor's bond
statute as being "applicable only to contracts involving buildings
or structures of some sort."
P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1956). 7

Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah 2d 364, 294
In Backus, the Utah Supreme Court

held that leveling of land alone was not an improvement upon land
under the contractor's bond statute.
Subsequent Utah cases have confirmed that work must be done
14-2-1 defines an "owner" in terms other than a holder of an
interest in property, it is irrelevant whether U S WEST
Communications' permit to place telephone cable in the public road
constituted an interest in land.
6

The statute was amended in 1989, although the amendment
does not alter its substance. For purposes of this argument,
reference will be to the 1987 version of the statute, which
appears in Addendum C. The 1989 version appears in Addendum D.
7

Although Backus involved an interpretation of Utah's
previous contractor's bond statute, the court's reasoning is
equally applicable here, since identical terms ("construction ...
alteration or repair of, any building, structure or improvement
upon land") are also at issue in the present case.
6

as an integral part of the construction, alteration, or repair of
a building or structure to qualify as an "improvement upon land"
within the meaning of the statute.

In fact, no Utah court has

ever required a contractor's bond for work on land without any
direct connection to work on a building or similar structure.
In Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah
1967), for example, the court held that landscaping was an
improvement upon land because it "was done as an integral part of
the building of a home." The Frehner court explained: "The
distinction [from Backus] is that [in Backus] the leveling of land
was not done in connection with any building, structure, or
improvement upon the land."

Id. at 449.

In the present case, the

underground cable is not an improvement under the statute because
it was not installed as an integral part of a building or
structure.
Both Backus and Frehner relied on the same principle of
statutory construction, the doctrine of ejusdem generis. As
expressed in Backus,
The reasonable interpretation of the legislative intent,
gathered from the statute, would seem to make it applicable
only to contracts involving buildings or structures of some
sort. . . .
. . .

Nor do we feel that it is necessary to call upon any
rules of statutory interpretation since the language seems
not to require interpretation. However, under a familiar
rule of construction the expression 'or improvement upon
land7 can only refer to improvements of a character similar
to those immediately before mentioned. (Sutherland Statutory
ConstructionF 3rd Ed., Vol. 2, p. 393, Sec. 4909).
294 P.2d at 704-05 (emphasis added).
7

In Frehner. the Court further

explained that the rule of construction referred to in Backus is
the Rule of Ejusdem Generis, sometimes called Lord
Tenterden's Rule, the doctrine being that where an
enumeration of specific things is followed by some more
general word or phrase, such general word or phrase is to be
held to refer to things of the same kind with respect to a
classification which immediately precedes it.
Frehner, 424 P.2d at 449.
A related principle of statutory construction also supports
denial of liability in this case.

In Graco Fishing and Rental

Tools. Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration. Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1078-79
(Utah 1988), the court held that rental charges were not covered
under the contractor's bond statute, because at the time, they
were not expressly mentioned therein.

Quoting from Stanton

Transportation Co. v. Davis. 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959),
the court stated:
"While it is true that our statutes are to be liberally
construed to give effect to their purpose and to promote
justice, it is equally true that they should not be distorted
beyond the intent of the legislature. This principle is
particularly applicable in a situation of this kind where a
liability is imposed upon the property owner beyond what he
contracted to bear for the improvement of his property. In
order to impose upon him such additional burdens the law must
clearly spell out the responsibility."
Id. at 1079 (emphasis added in Graco, not in Stanton).

In the

present case, the statute does not clearly spell out the
responsibility of a utility company to obtain a bond for the
placement of cable beneath a public street; indeed, the language
"building, structure, or improvement upon land" implies that other
types of construction are excluded from coverage.

Therefore,

under Utah law, U S WEST Communications should not be held liable
8

for failing to procure a bond in the circumstances of this case.
Utah cases in the area of mechanic's lien law support a
conclusion that the installation of underground cable does not
constitute an improvement upon land under the contractor's bond
statute.

In King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 Utah 2d

339, 374 P.2d 254, 255 (Utah 1962), the court noted that "because
of the common purpose of these lien and contractor's bond
statutes, and their practically identical language, adjudications
as to what is lienable under the former are helpful in determining
the proper application of the latter."

See also, Allen Steel Co.

v. Crossroads Plaza Associates, 119 Utah Adv. Rep 6, 14 (filed
Oct. 6, 1989); Graco Fishing and Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood
Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1078-79 (Utah 1988).

In the

present case, the trial court granted U S WEST Communications'
motion for summary judgment on Dalton's mechanic's lien claim.
(R. 51-52, 66-94, 128-29)

Under the cases cited, that fact alone

would tend to support dismissal of the contractor's bond claim,
since it would defeat the "common purpose" of the two statutes to
deny liability under one, while imposing liability under the
other.

In Allen Steel, the Supreme Court stated:

In light of our discussion infra affirming the trial court's
finding that the landowners/lessors are not liable under the
mechanic's lien statute, that is an additional reason why the
landowners/lessors are not liable under the contractor's bond
statute.
119 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14.
Other mechanic's lien cases also support dismissal of the
9

contractor's bond claim in this case.

In Tripp v. Vaughn, 747

P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1987), this Court held that a sewer stub-in
placed within the boundaries of a subdivision was not an
improvement upon land for purposes of the mechanics7 lien statute.
The Court stated:

"[T]he installation of the sewer line was an

incidental item of work done as a part of an overall valley-wide
sewer project . . . for the benefit of the sewer project."

Id. at

1053.
On the other hand, in First of Denver Mortgage Investors v.
C.N. Zundel & Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), the Utah
Supreme Court held that installation of a sewer system within a
subdivision was lienable.

In distinguishing First of Denver, the

Court in Tripp noted the difference between a sewer stub-in and an
entire sewer system built as part of a subdivision project.
P.2d at 1054.

747

The basis for the distinction was whether the

installation was an integral part of the development of a specific
building or buildings.
The implications of the cited cases to the present case are
obvious.

Here, the length of telephone cable installed under the

public street was completely independent of any building project
or structure.

Similar to Tripp, the telephone cable was

presumably installed as part of a general project to improve U S
WEST Communications' telephone system.8
8

It was also installed at

In the present case, there was no evidence as to the
purpose for the telecommunications cable, nor that it was ever
connected to a specific building, subdivision or other structure,
10

no charge to any particular building project, and no contractor or
subcontractor could claim a lien on the public street.

See Tripp,

747 P.2d at 1053. Therefore, to be consistent with these Utah
precedents, this Court must reverse the trial court's decision and
hold that the underground telephone cable did not constitute an
"improvement upon land" under the contractor's bond statute.
B.

The installation of underground telephone cable did not
add any value to the public street.

The purpose of the mechanics' lien and contractor's bond
statutes is to protect against an uncompensated increase in the
value of real property.

King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln

Company. 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254, 255 (Utah 1962).

See also.

First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Associates,
600 P.2d 521, 525 (Utah 1979); Frehner v. Morton. 18 Utah 2d 422,
424 P.2d 446, 447 (Utah 1967).

If work does not "add directly to

the value of the property," it is not covered.

See Daniels v.

Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 771 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah
App. 1989) (inspection and repair of water damage held not to
extend the time for filing a notice of lien).

"For work to add to

the value of property it is necessary that the work benefit the
specific property in question."

Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713, 715

nor that it became part of U S WEST Communications'
telecommunications network or otherwise was placed in operation.
(See Tr. 60-62)
11

(Utah App. 1988). 9

In Rotta. this Court held that the clearing of

brush and trees and removal of dirt from two parcels of land for
use elsewhere did not constitute lienable work as to the parcels
from which the dirt was removed.

This Court concluded: "The

statute has no application to the circumstances as in this case
where the work was done for another project."

756 P.2d at 715.

By analogy, under the rule stated in Rotta, the contractor's
bond statute does not protect the work performed in the present
case, because the underground cable in no way benefits the public
road where it was installed.

The only conceivable benefit the

cable provided was to U S WEST Communications' telecommunications
system, not to the public road.

At the trial, Dalton did not even

attempt to introduce evidence to prove that the value of the land
was improved by installation of the telecommunications cable.10
To hold that a length of underground telephone cable is an
improvement to a public street, even though it does not add value
to the street, would be completely contrary to the established
purpose of the contractor's bond statute, to prevent the
uncompensated increase in value of the real property.

Because the

underground cable did not benefit the specific property or
9

In Rotta, this court held that the clearing of brush and
removal of dirt from two parcels of land for the benefit of a
building project on a separate parcel of land was not an
improvement for mechanics' lien purposes. Rotta, 756 P.2d 713.
10

Indeed, the cable may actually have devalued the land, in
the sense that a purchaser of the highway would be more reluctant
to purchase, knowing that a utility line and its at-tendant dangers
and potential liabilities lay beneath the surface.
12

increase the value of the public street, it does not meet the
"threshold requirement" of an "improvement,"
715.

Rotta, 756 P.2d at

Therefore, U S WEST Communications is not liable as an

"owner" under sections 14-2-1 and -2 of the Utah Code.
C.

The underground telephone cable is not real property.

In King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co.. 13 Utah 2d 339, 374
P.2d 254, 256 (1962), the court stated:
To qualify under [the mechanics' lien and the contractor's
bond statutes], it is necessary that there be an annexation
to the land, or to some permanent structure upon it, so that
the materials in question can properly be regarded as having
become a part of the realty; or a fixture appurtenant to it;
and this must have been done with the intention of making it
a permanent part thereof.
See also, Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assn..

Ill

P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah App. 1989) (investor profits are not
lienable).

In Paul Mueller Company v. Cache Valley Dairy

Association, 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court
held that whey drying equipment, attached to the cement floor of a
building by bolts, welding, wiring, and ducts, was not real
property for mechanics' lien purposes.

The court identified the

following three criteria to be considered in determining whether
materials have become fixtures:
(1) [the] manner in which the item is attached or annexed to
realty; (2) whether the item is adaptable to the particular
use of the realty; and (3) the intention of the annexor to
make an item a permanent part of the realty.
Id. at 1283.

The court determined that the personal property was

not annexed for mechanics7 lien purposes because the equipment
13

could be removed easily and without damage to the building.

Id.

Also, the whey drying equipment was not adapted to the property
even though the building housing the equipment was used solely for
whey drying.

"Equipment is not 'adapted' to the use of real

property where the real property itself is adaptable to multiple
uses and where it is solely the presence of the equipment itself
which determines the purpose served by the real property."

Id.

In the present case, Dalton did not submit any proof that the
underground cable was ever annexed to the land in the manner
required by Paul Mueller Company.
is not sufficient proof.

Id.

Mere physical attachment alone

Neither has there been an

adaptation of the cable to the use of the real property.

The

underground telephone cable does not further the specific purpose
of the road.

The presence of the underground cable has not

determined, enhanced, improved, or in any way affected the use of
the public road.

It is a public roadway in spite of the existence

of the underground cable.

Hence the contractor's bond statute,

which only applies to realty, is not applicable in this case.
In summary, the contractor's bond statute does not apply in
this case because the telecommunications cable was not installed
as an integral part of the construction, alteration, or repair of
a building or structure, it did not add any value to the realty,
and it was not annexed to the realty.

14

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ORDERING
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AGAINST U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS FOR AN
UNLIQUIDATED CLAIM.
The law is well established in Utah that a prevailing party

is only entitled to prejudgment interest where the loss is fixed
as of a particular time and the amount of the loss can be
calculated with mathematical accuracy.
Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 1983);
Inc.. 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977).

Joraensen v. John Clav and

Biork v. April Industries,
Under Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-

2, a plaintiff may recover the "reasonable value" of work
performed and materials supplied, which is not necessarily the
price at which he agreed to furnish the work and materials.11
See, e.g., Steel Components, Inc. v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 28 Utah 2d 25, 497 P.2d 646 (1972); Asphalt
Products, Inc. v. Paulos Auto Co., 17 Utah 2d 402, 413 P.2d 596
(1966).

The statute specifically establishes the contract price

as a ceiling on the amount of recovery.

That, however, does not

allow an inference that the contract price, by itself, establishes
a reasonable value.

Since reasonable value is necessarily

something about which reasonable persons may differ, and therefore
cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy, Dalton7s claim
against U S WEST Communications does not qualify for prejudgment

11

Conclusion of Law #4 misstates the applicable law in
stating that U S WEST Communications is "liable under 14-2-2,
U.C.A. 1953 as amended for unpaid labor and materials, which
constitute an improvement upon the land," rather than stating that
liability under the statute is for the "reasonable value" of labor
and materials. (R. 138)
15

interest under Utah law.
The record in this case supports the conclusion that the
amount in question was not liquidated because there was a bona
fide dispute as to the reasonable value of the work performed.
Dalton's evidence of reasonable value consisted solely of his own
opinion.

(Tr. 17-18)

That opinion was founded, upon weak and

imprecise evidence of the actual costs involved in the job.
For example, although Dalton testified that he kept records
of the wages paid and actual costs incurred for the rental of
equipment, he did not produce them at the trial, and could not
tell how much he paid any one employee.

(Tr. 36-37)

Rather, he

"estimated" that the wages he paid were $5,000 to $6,000 (Tr. 39,
46).

There was no evidence that the wages he paid were customary

in the industry or the locality; in fact, he testified that the
wages paid were "12 to $15 a hour" (Tr. 36), even though his bid
for some of the work used a figure of $10 per hour (Tr. 39-40, Ex.
7-D). 1 2
Dalton also testified that he procured "approximately" $2,100
worth of gravel for backfill (Tr. 47), that dump truck rental ran
"about $35 per hour" (Tr. 50-51), that the total rental for each
of the dump trucks was "around $1,500, something like that" (Tr.
51) and that the latter figure was just "a guess" (Tr. 51). He
agreed that he could not tell what his total out of pocket costs
were on the job (Tr. 49). Furthermore, Dalton was unsure when the
12

Three of the four employees were family members.
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(Tr. 35)

job started (Tr. 32-34), how many employees worked on the job
(Tr. 34-35), or exactly what their hours were (Tr. 33). He
testified that although the job took 15 days or less to complete,
he rented a backhoe for a full month at a charge of $2,800,
although he could have rented it at an daily rate of $150, which
would have resulted in a total backhoe cost of $2,250 for 15 days
of work.

(Tr. 47-49)

Even if it were held that such evidence was sufficient to
sustain a conclusion that the amount Dalton sought represented the
reasonable value of the work, it cannot remotely be held to be a
liquidated amount, such as is required for the imposition of
prejudgment interest.
In Modern Builders. Inc. v. Manke, 27 Wash. App. 86, 615 P.2d
1332 (1980), the court denied prejudgment interest in an action to
foreclose a labor and materialmen7s lien on a theory of quantum
meruit.

The court stated:

Prejudgment interest may be recovered only if a claim is
liquidated or otherwise computed by a fixed standard in the
contract without reference to extrinsic evidence, [citation
omitted] By its very nature, an award of damages based upon
quantum meruit is not liquidated and is not readily
ascertainable in the parties7 contract. Therefore,
prejudgment interest may not be awarded when a labor and
materialmen's lien is set by quantum meruit.
615 P.2d at 1339.

See also. Sherwood B. Korssioen. Inc. v.

Heiman, 765 P.2d 301, 307 (Wash. App. 1988).
Because Dalton's claim against U S WEST Communications
remained uncertain and incapable of precise calculation until the
trier of fact determined the reasonable value of his services,
17

Dalton is not entitled to prejudgment interest.

See Arcon

Construction Co. v. S.D. Cement Plant, 349 N.W.2d 407, 416 (S.D.
1984) ("A party is not entitled to prejudgment interest if the
amount of damages remains uncertain until determined by the trial
court.")
CONCLUSION
U S WEST Communications requests that the Utah Court of
Appeals reverse the district court's judgment.

The proper

interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 establishes that U S
WEST Communications was not an "owner" under the statute, because
the installation of telecommunications cable beneath a public
street is not an improvement upon land, adds nothing to the value
of the land, and is not realty.

The plain language of the statute

simply does not permit its application to this kind of case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l8 day of December, 1989.
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY

Floyd K. Jensen, Attorney
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following on the /ffi»day of December, 1989:
Lorin N. Pace, Esq.
Pace & Parsons
350 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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LORIN N. PACE No. 2498
350 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ALTL/*fcE COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BLAINE DALTON, dba
C & D CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 88-04963
WEULE, INC. and
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE &
TELEGRAPH COMPANY
Defendants,

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on Monday,
May 1, 1989, at 9:00 o'clock A.M., the Plaintiff being present in
Court with his Counsel, Lorin N. Pace, the Defendant being present
by its representatives and with Counsel, Floyd A. Jensen, and the
parties having presented exhibits and sworn testimony, and good
cause therefor appearing the Court now makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

BLAINE DALTON, the Plaintiff, is an individual doing

business as C & D CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a sole proprietorship.
2.

Defendant WEULE, INC., is a corporation qualified to

do business in the State of Utah.

3.

Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH

COMPANY is a corporation qualified to do business in the State of
Utah.

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company also does

business under the name of U.S. WEST COMMUNICATIONS.
4c

Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH

COMPANY prior to April 21, 1988, had obtained unwritten consent of
South Salt Lake City to lay a communications cable underground a
distance of about three (3) blocks through the streets of South
Salt Lake City.
5.

Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH

COMPANY entered into a written contract with Defendant WEULE, INC.
to install the underground communications cable in South Salt Lake
City.
6.

The unwritten consent to lay a communications cable

in the streets of South Salt Lake City was an interest in land
belonging to MOUNTAIN STATES TELEHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
7.

Defendant WEULE, INC. entered into a subcontract

agreement with Plaintiff BLAINE DALTON, dba C & D CONSTRUCTION, to
lay the cable as referred to above.
8.

Plaintiff provided labor, materials and equipment to

perform the subcontract.
9.

Defendant WEULE, INC. agreed to pay Plaintiff the sum

of $12,856.59 for the execution of the subcontract.
10.

Plaintiff commenced work about May 1, 1988, and

completed the work on or about May 23, 1988.
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11.

The total contract to lay the cable was in excess of

$2,000,00.
12.

Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH

COMPANY did not require WEULE, INC. to post a bond.
13.

Plaintiff obtained a judgment against WEULE, INC. but

has been unable to collect any amounts on said judgment*
14.

The improvements upon the land provided to Defendant

MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY by Plaintiff were
reasonably worth $12,856.59.
15.

On or about the 14th day of June, 1988, a registered

letter was sent to Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH COMPANY making demand on the Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY for payment and giving notice of a
claim on the bond.

Said notice was mailed within ninety (90) days

of the completion of the work.
16.

The legal action herein was commenced prior to one

(1) year after completion of the work
17.

Plaintiff subcontracted a portion of the contract and

that subcontractor has not yet been paid.
18.

Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH

COMPANY is the owner of the improvements upon the land created by
the contract performance.
19.

Plaintiff is owed the sum of $12,856.59, plus

interest, from May 23, 1988f to date of payment and Plaintiff has
not been paid.

-3-

20.

Based upon 14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953 as amended, the

Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY is
indebted to the Plaintiff in the amount of $12,856.59, plus
interest from May 23, 1988, to date of payment.
The Court now having made its Findings of Fact, now makes
the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The consent to lay a communications cable through the

streets of South Salt Lake City is an interest in land.
2.

The laying of the cable through the streets of South

Salt Lake City is an improvement upon an interest in land under
U.C.A. 14-2-2.
3.

Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH

COMPANY having obtained the permission of South Salt Lake City to
lay a communications cable through the streets of South Salt Lake
City and MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY having
contracted for the laying of said cable was a contract for
improvement upon the land.
4.

Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH

COMPANY was obligated by statute to require a bond from its
contractor WEULE, INC. and did not do so, and is therefore liable
under 14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, for unpaid labor and
materials, which constituted an improvement upon the land.
5.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant

MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY in the amount of

-4-

TWELVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX AND 59/100 DOLLARS
($12,856.59), plus interest from May 23, 2988.
6.

Plaintiff, C & D CONSTRUCTION should be ordered to

pay an unpaid materials and labor claim in the amount of THREE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($3,767.00)
to ERICKSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and to indemnify and hold harmless Defendant, MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
against any claims from said Company.
DATED this

3ft

day of JfcJy, 1989.
FOR THE COURT:

By OQ^feyl ) rJu*^A)Su)
JUDGE

Approved as to Form:

FLOYD A. JENSEN, Attorney for Defendant

<A^-i-0^
LORIN N. PACE, Attorney for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM B

JUDGMENT

Mi

LORIN N. PACE No. 2498
350 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300
Attorney for Plaintiff

2 0 1983

S^LT LAKtsCOUNTV

"V'--*') vi*'«'ii.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SWtfLl
BLAINE DALTON, dba

^ 7 ?/?/-!

C & D CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

vs.
Case No. 88-04963
WEULE, INC. and
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE &
TELEGRAPH COMPANY
Defendants,

The above-entitled matter was tried before the Court
sitting without a jury on Monday, May 1, 1989.

The Plaintiff,

BLAINE DALTON, was present in Court with his Counsel, Lorin N.
Pace.

The Defendant, MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH

COMPANY, was present by its representatives and with Counsel,
Floyd A. Jensen.

The witnesses of the parties were sworn and

testified and exhibits introduced, and the Court having made its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the
following Judgment and Decree.
Plaintiff is granted Judgment over and against Defendant
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY in the amount of

f\r\f\<

/ITS

TWELVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX AND 59/100 DOLLARS
($12 f 856,59).

Plaintiff shall pay out of said Judgment the amount

of THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS
($3,767.00) to ERICKSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY for subcontract
asphalt work on the Weule Contract,

Plaintiff shall hold Defen-

dant harmless and indemnify Defendant against any claim from said
Erickson Construction Company.
DATED this

£p

day of Me-r> 1989.
FOR THE COURT:

By.

Judge

Approved as to Form:

FLOYD A. JENSEN, Attorney for Defendant

LORIN N. PACE, Attorney for Plaintiff
Certificate of Mailing
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree in the above entitled case
to FLOYD A. JENSEN, Attorney for Defendant, MOUNTAIN STATES
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, by depositing the same in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid, this ^S
^ day of May- 1989.

Z% v*-*^.
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ADDENDUM C

UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 14-2-1 & 14-2-2
(1987 VERSION)

CHAPTER 2
PRIVATE CONTRACTS
Section
14-2-1.

Definitions — Payment bond required —
Right of action — Notice.
14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment bond —
Liability.
14-2-3, 14-2-4. Repealed.

14-2-1. Definitions — Payment bond required —
Right of action — Notice.
(1) For purposes of this chapter
(a) "Contractor" means any person who is or
may be awarded a contract for the construction,
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or
improvement upon land.
(b) "Owner" means any person contracting for
construction, alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon land.
(2) Before any contract, exceeding $2,000 in
amount, for the construction, alteration, or repair of
any building, structure, or improvement upon land is
awarded to any contractor, the owner shall obtain
from the contractor a payment bond complying with
Subsection (3), which shall become binding upon the
award of the contract to the contractor.
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or
sureties satisfactory to the owner for the protection of
all persons supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract in a
sum equal to the contract price.
(4) (a) Any person who has furnished labor or material in the prosecution of the work provided for
in such contract, in respect of which a payment
bond is furnished under this chapter, and who
has not been paid in full therefor within 90 days
after the day on which the last of the labor was
performed by him or material was supplied by
him for which the claim is made, may sue on the
payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time
the suit is filed and may prosecute the action for
the amount due him. Any person having a contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but
no express or implied contract with the contractor furnishing the payment bond, has a right of
action upon the payment bond upon giving written notice to the contractor within 90 days from
the date on which such person performed the last
of the labor or supplied the last of the material
for which the claim is made. The person shall
state in the notice the amount claimed and the
name of the party for whom the labor was performed or to whom the material was supplied.
The notice shall be served by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, on the contractor at
any place the contractor maintains an office or
conducts business.
(b) Any suit instituted under this section shall
be brought in the district court of any county in
which the contract was to be performed, and not
elsewhere. No such suit may be commenced after
the expiration of one year after the day on which
the last of the labor was performed or material
was supplied by the person. The obligee named in
the bond need not be joined as a party in the suit.
(5) T h e payment bond shall be exhibited to a n y
interested person upon r e q u e s t
19S7
14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment
bond — Liability.
Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond is
liable to all persons who have performed labor or
have supplied materials under the contract for the
reasonable value of the labor performed or materials
furnished. No action to recover on such liability may
be commenced after the expiration of one year after
the day on which the last of the labor was performed
or the material was supplied by such person.
1967

ADDENDUM D

UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 14-2-1 & 14-2-2
(1989 VERSION)

CHAPTER 2
PRIVATE CONTRACTS
Section
14-2-1.

Definitions — Payment bond required —
Right of action — Notice — Attorneys*
fees.
14-2-2.
Failure of owner to obtain payment bond —
Liability.
14-2-3, 14-2-4. Repealed.
14-2-5.
Preliminary notice requirement.
14-2-1.

Definitions — Payment b o n d required —
Right of action — Notice — Attorneys'
fees.
(1) For purposes of this chapter:
(a) "Contractor" means any person who is or
may be awarded a contract for the construction,
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or
improvement upon land.
(b) "Owner" means any person contracting for
construction, alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon land.
(2) Before any contract exceeding $2,000 in
amount for the construction, alteration, or repair of
any building, structure, or improvement upon land is
awarded to any contractor, the owner shall obtain
from the contractor a payment bond complying with
Subsection (3). The bond shall become binding upon
the award of the contract to the contractor.
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or
sureties satisfactory to the owner for the protection of
all persons supplying labor, services, equipment, or
material in the prosecution of the work provided for
in the contract in a sum equal to the contract price.
(4) A person shall have a right of action on a payment bond under this chapter for any unpaid amount
due him if:

(a) he has furnished labor, services, equipment, or material in the prosecution of the work
provided for in the contract for which the payment bond is furnished under this chapter; and
(b) he has not been paid in full within 90 days
after the last day on which he performed the
labor or service or supplied the equipment or material for which the claim is made.
(5) An action under this section shall be brought in
a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where
the contract was to be performed and not elsewhere.
The action is barred if not commenced within one
year after the last day on which the claimant performed the labor or service or supplied the equipment
or material on which the claim is based. The obligee
named in the bond need not be joined as a party to the
action. In any action upon a bond, the court may
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party, which fees shall be taxed as costs in the action.
(6) The payment bond shall be exhibited to any
interested person upon request.
(7) In any suit upon a payment bond under this
chapter, the court shall award reasonable attorneys'
fees to the prevailing party.
1989
14-2-2.

F a i l u r e of o w n e r to obtain payment
bond — Liability.
(1) Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond
is liable to each person who performed labor or service or supplied equipment or materials under the
contract for the reasonable value of the labor or service performed or the equipment or materials furnished up to but not exceeding the contract price.
(2) No action to recover on this liability may be
commenced after the expiration of one year after the
day on which the last of the labor or service was performed or the equipment or material was supplied by
the person.
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party. These fees shall be taxed as costs in
the action.
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